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RECENT CASE NOTES
AUTOMOBILES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-COMIERcE.-Action by the city
of South Bend against Sprout. Judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appeals.
An ordinance of the City of South Bend, authorized
under Burns' Ann. St. 1926, § 10284, cls. 32, 38, required the owner
of every motor driven commercial vehicle operated within the city, to
obtain an indemnity bond conditioned to pay for injuries, and a license
from the city before it could do business as a carrier of passengers within
its limits. The appellant operated a bus between South Bend and Niles,
Mich., and had not complied with the ordinance. He received only passengers who would pay fare to a point in another state and contends that
the ordinance is void because it undertakes to regulate and impose burdens
upon interstate commerce in violation of the third clause of section 8,
article 1, of the Constitution of the U. S. Held: Although the appellant
was exclusively engaged in interstate commerce, the use of the city streets
as a place for the solicitation and acceptance of passengers brought him
within the police power of the state to license and regulate both driver
and vehicle by way of providing for the safety and general welfare of the
public, so long, at least, as Congress has not legislated on the subject.
Sprout v. City of South Bend, 153 N. E. 504. Petition for rehearing overruled, 154 N. E. 369.
So far as the regulation of interstate commerce is concerned the doctrine of the U. S. Supreme Court now is that the states do not have a concurrent power with the federal government, at least, where the interstate
commerce concerns a matter national in scope, but that they do have the
right to exercise some police power. The requirement of an indemnity
bond would seem to be a proper exercise of such power. Coolen v. Board
of Wardens of Philadelphia,12 How. 299; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100;
Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524. The Court in the principal case
does not discuss the constitutionality of the license fee levied by the City
of South Bend. The federal constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce. Art. I, § 8-3. No state has the right to
lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form. Lying v. Mich., 135 U. S.
161; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. Except so far as it is necessary to
carry into effect its police power. Smith v. St. Louis and S. W. Ry. Co.,
181 U. S. 248; Patapsco Guano Co. v. N. Car. Board of Agriculture, 171
U. S. 345; Bowman v. Chi. and N. W. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465. Although the
Supreme Court of U. S. has held that a state can not require a license fee
as a condition precedent to the right of an interstate carrier to do business
within its limits, Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., et al., 47
Sup. Ct. Rep. 298; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307; Bush Co. v. Afaloy,
267 U. S. 317; DeSanta v. Commonwealth of Pa., 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267;
Ticklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1; nor other conditions
precedent; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 202, yet it has also declared that the amount of
a license fee imposed by a state upon interstate carriers may be properly
based not only on the cost of inspection and regulation under its police
power, but also on the cost of maintaining improved roads. Huse v. Glover,
119 U. S. 543; Hendricks v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Kane v. N. J., 243
U. S. 160; Martine v. Kozen, 11 F. (2nd) 645; 21 IlI. L. Rev. 559. Perhaps a
state should be allowed to make a reasonable charge for furnishing facili-
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ties for the use of those engaged in interstate commerce. But can the
principle that a state cannot impose any conditions precedent to the right
to do interstate business stand together with the proposition that the state
has the right to prohibit to an interstate carrier by motor vehicle the use of
its street until a license is bbtained from the state?
R. E. M.
CRIMINAL LAW-ORAL INSTRUCTIONS TO Juny.-Appellant was charged
with unlawfully buying, concealing, and aiding in the concealment of, certain diamonds alleged to have been stolen, having full knowledge that said
diamonds were stolen property. At the conclusion of the evidence and
before the argument had begun, the appellant tendered to the Court sixteen instructions in writing, together with a written request signed by
the counsel for the defendant that the Court should "instruct the jury in
writing, and give to the jury the following instructions, and each of them,"
and of the instructions so requested the Court gave all but one, after which
he gave further instructions orally. Appellant was found guilty, fined
and sentenced. Overruling his motion for a new trial is assigned as error,
under which appellant complains because the trial court gave oral instructions to the jury of more than 1,500 words, taken down by the reporter
in shorthand, and constituting nine instructions, in the course of which the
indictment and statutes were read, grand and petit larceny explained, and
general statements of the law were given. Question arising is whether
or not the oral instructions constitute a reversible error. Held: Reversible
error, in absence of showing of waiver. Lindey v. State, Supreme Court of
Indiana, Oct 26, 1926, 153 N. E. 772.
Burns' Ann. St. 1926, § 2301, subd. 5, reads as follows: "The Court
must then charge the jury, which charge, upon the request of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant or his counsel, made at any time before the
commencement of the argument, shall be in writing and the instructions
therein contained numbered and signed by the court."
Where the Court is required, pursuant to the statute, to instruct the
jury in writing, it is fatal error to read from the printed statutes; but
the matter should b& copied into a written instruction and read from the
copy: Smurr v. State, 88 Ind. 504; Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358;
Littell v. State, 133 Ind. 577. Requirement of written instructions at
request of either party is mandatory and is not complied with by directing
the official stenographer to transcribe the oral charge. Brindle v. State,
88 S. E. 460. The act of the court reporter in taking down the oral instructions does not convert them into written instructions as required by
statute. Lesener v. State, 136 Ind. 448. The statutory right to have the
jury instructed may be waived even in a criminal case. Bird v. State, 210
p. 925. However, in the case at bar, the defendant at the time of the
giving of the oral instructions separately and severally excepted to them.
This sufficiently shows that the defendant excepted to the actions of the
Court in giving the oral instructions and did not waive the request for
written instructions.
In Lindley v. State (Nov. 3, 1926), 153 N. E. 890, which followed the
principal case, the appellant was charged with violation of the liquor law;
tried by jury and at the proper time presented to the trial court a written
request that the Court should instruct the jury in writing and give certain
written instructions. The Court gave all the written instructions but one
and then proceeded to give another series of instructions orally to which
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the appellant reserved an exception. Court held this to be a reversible
error. These two cases, being decided at practically the same time, are
good law and the decisions are backed by the weight of authority.
R. W. M.
NEGLIGE:NcE-EvIDENcE--APPAL--ERRoR.-Appellee recovered in the
lower court in an action for damages for personal injuries, alleged by
appellee to have been caused by her falling in an aisle of the Lyric Theater
in Indianapolis, Indiana, operated by the appellant. Complaint charged
that the seats in the rear of the theater were placed on a floor level several
inches higher than the aisle, that the aisle was insufficiently lighted, with
no warning of danger, that appellee left her seat in the rear of the theater,
fell over the step-off into the aisle and broke her left arm at the wrist,
that the ushers had gone home and the lights were turned out for a vaudeville performance, that appellee had never been in that part of the theater
before and did not know of the step-off, that appellant owned and operated
several theaters in Indianapolis and kept cashiers at the doors for the
purpose of collecting the admission. Appellant entered a general denial.
A jury awarded appellee damages of $750. Appellant's motion for a new
trial was overruled and appellant brings error, contending that the verdict
of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Held: Judgment
affirmed. Central Amusement Co. v. Van Nostran, Indiana Appellate Court,
June 2, 1926, 152 N. E. 183.
Appellant's first contention is that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence. In an action for personal injuries alleged
to have been caused by defendant's negligence, plaintiff must prove by a
fair preponderance of the evidence, defendant's negligence and his own
injury, but need not prove freedom from contributory negligence. Indiana
Union Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 176 Ind. 263. What is or is not negligence
is a question for the jury. City of Greencastle v. Martin, 74 Ind. 449, 39
Am. Rep. 93. Appellant next contends that there is no evidence that appellee was in appellant's theater by invitation, that she had paid admission, or that she was other than a licensee. Here there was no direct evidence that appellee had paid but there was evidence that appellant had a cashier at the entrance, whose purpose it was to sell admissions, and where there is no evidence to the contrary, very slight evidence
is sufficient to sustain a fact. Ferger et al. v. Interprovincial Flour Mills,
80 Ind. App. 248, 140 N. E. 450. Moody et al. v. State ex rel. Burton, 84
Ind. 433; Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Ry. Co. v. Goodbar, 88 Ind.
213. Appellant next contended that it was reversible error for the court to
permit evidence of other persons falling from the same step-off before the
time of the accident here involved. Evidence of other persons previously
falling over the same step-off was not reversible error. To show that a
defect in property existed and caused a particular injury, evidence of other
accidents or injuries occurring about the same time or place, from same
or similar cause is admissible. Cleveland, C., C. and I. Ry. Co. v.'Newell,
104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836; Louisville, N. A. and C. Ry. v. Lang, 13 Ind.
App. 337, 41 N. E. 609; Medsker v. Pogue, 1 Ind. App. 197, 27 N. E. 432;
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 458; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401,
13 Am. Rep. 55. It is not the universal rule, however, that in showing
the dangerous quality of a thing, testimony as to its effect at other times
may be given. The whole question is one that must rest in the sound discretion of the court. There is a danger in admitting the evidence, in that
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it opens the door to such a wide field of collateral inquiry.
Evidence, Sec. 114.

McKelvey on
A. E. B.

WILLs-COqSTRUcTIoN.-The testatrix made a residuary devise to her

brother and sister in equal shares. Devise provided that should the brother
die before the testatrix, the whole of the property should go to the sister,
but no mention of the possibility that the sister should predecease testatrix.
The sister died before testatrix, and the brother claims the whole of the
property under the residuary clause. There are no other heirs except
collateral heirs whom testatrix specifically excluded from the estate. The
collateral heirs now claim the lapsed devise by intestacy. Judgment for
the brother below. Held: Residuary devise vested in the brother. Hedges
et al v. Payne et al. Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 9, 1926, 154 N. E.
293.
The collateral heirs claim under the general rule: "Where the residuary
gift is to several persons as to one of whom the gift lapses or is void,
his share goes to the testator's heirs on next of kin and does not increase
the shares of the other residuary beneficiaries." 40 Cyc. 1952. But this rule
is predicated on the common law distinction between a lapsed bequest of
personal property and a lapsed devise of real estate, the former going to
the residuary legatee, the latter to the heir, 4 Kent Com. 541; Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293. But the reason for this distinction, that the will would
operate on all the personalty at death, but that the testator could only
devise such realty as he owned at the time of making the will, Holbrook
et al v. McCleary et al., 79 Ind. 161, is abrogated by See. 3502, Burns' 1926,
which provides, "Every devise in terms denoting the testator's intention
to devise his entire interest in all his real or personal property shall be
construed to pass all of the estate in such property . . . which, he was entitled to devise at his death. . . ." Thus lapsed devises or legacies go into
the residuary portion of the estate and pass to the residuary devisees or
legatees. Holbrook v. McCleary, 79 Ind. 167.
The intention of the testator, as shown by the language of his will
must govern in construing his will. Corey v. Springer, 138 Ind. 506. And
partial intestacy is to be avoided in the construction of wills unless the
language of the will compels it. Myers v. Carney, 171 Ind. 379, 384. Here
the testator clearly intended to devise all his property, and the provision
of equal shares was put in only to show how the testator wished the two
residuary devisees to take, should they both survive. Gray v. Bailey, 42
Ind. 349. The case is clearly right, in view of the above authority and
rules, and the abrogation by statute of the common law distinction between
B. B. C.
estates of personalty and realty devised by will.
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24979.

THE ALLIED MAGNET WIRE CORP. v. TuTTLE.
Marion County.
Petition for rehearing denied. Martin, J. April 19, 1927.
A corporation may not be dissolved at the request of the shareholders
and a receiver appointed merely because dividends that are indicated as
payable at a certain time are not in fact paid. The petition for rehearing
in this case was overruled. But a dissenting opinion was filed holding
that the petition for a re-hearing should have been granted since there
was an express contract in keeping with the statute according to which
the preferred stockholders could dissolve the corporation where the preferred dividends were not paid. (Burns' 1926, sec. 4837.)

Marion County. Reversed. Gemmill, C. J. April
6, 1917.
It is reversible error for the prosecution in a criminal case to introduce
evidence of the defendant's character unless and until the defendant himself has introduced evidence of his good character.

25117 BOLDEN V. STATE.

25269 GROSE V. STATE. Marion County. Affirmed. Gemmill, C. J. April 27,
1927.
Where there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the lower
court, the court on appeal will not reverse the judgment because of conflicting evidence.
25255 LOWERY V. STATE. Monroe County. Afflrmed. Gemmill, C. J. April
22, 1927.
Where appellant, who was transporting a package, tried to conceal it
and that package in fact contained intoxicating liquor, the jury was warranted in inferring that he knew he was doing an unlawful act.
24415 MALES V. STATE. Madison County. Reversed. Travis, J. April 30, 1927.
An instruction that it must appear to the "reasonable satisfaction of
the jury" that the defendant acted in self defense is erroneous in a prosecution for second degree murder. If the jury entertains reasonable doubt
of defendant's guilt in acting in self defense, then the jury should acquit
the defendant.
25235 RHODES V. STATE. Knox County. Reversed. Myers, J. April 27, 1927.

Where defendant is not adequately advised of his rights or of the laws
of the state concerning the punishment for the crime with which he is
charged, it is error for the court to permit him to plead guilty and to impose sentence of death on this plea.
25215 SPEYREOECK V. STATE, St. Joseph County. Affirmed. Martin, J. April
6, 1927.
An officer may not search a soft drink parlor for intoxicating liquor
where he does not see a violation of the law unless he first reads a search
warrant. (Burns' 1926, sec. 2158.)
Where there is a general verdict
given on the complaint containing two counts and one of these counts is
bad while the other is good, the judgment on the one will be sustained.
629
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25353 STATE V. BOWMAN, State Auditor. Marion County. Reversed. Travis,
J. April 19, 1927.
The legislature may constitutionally increase the salaries of its own
members to cover the then present term for which they were elected. This
is held not td involve retroactive legislation or to violate the constitution
in any way. Dissenting opinion by Willoughby, J. and concurring opinion
by Martin, J. in same case.
25169 UNION TRACTION CO. OF INDIANA V. HINGER, ADME. ETC. Hendricks
County. Reversed. Myers, J. April 7, 1927.
Where a person has been guilty of contributory negligence he can only
recover if the negligence of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury which operated in such a way that his own negligence did not contribute to the injury.

APPELLATE COURT.
12697 ABSHIRE V. SMITH ET AL. Kosciusko County. Reversed. Remy, J.
April 28, 1927.
Where a contract is made whereby one party is to buy gasoline at the
market price from the other part§ who has made a loan conditioned on
this purchase, then there may be issued an injunction forbidding this party
from buying his gasoline from anyone else. This equitable relief to enforce the contract is given on the ground that the loan was made without
security in reliance upon the contracted purchase and damages for breach
of contract are indefinite and inadequate since the party has the benefit
of the loan and will continue to refuse to purchase the gasoline unless the
injunction is issued.
12944 ATZ V. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, ET AL. Marion County. Reversed. McMahan, C. J. April 21, 1927.
Under the amendment of 1919 to the statute covering the assessment of
taxes for improvements of streets in cities of the first class (Burns' 1926,
sec. 10445), it is required that the cities assess the property on intersecting
streets in accordance with the statute and not merely property on the street
that is improved.
12615 BASSETT, ET AL V. SOUTH. Howard County. Affirmed. McMahan, C. J.
Nichols, J. concurs in results. April 28, 1927.
Where the total estate of the deceased husband is not worth more than
$500, his real property will go to the widow as part of her minimum alotment of the $500 even though she was a third and childless wife while
children by previous marriages survived.
12674 BRASSAND V. STONER. Newton County. Affirmed. McMahan, C. J.
April 1, 1927.
Where a provision is made for a surviving husband in a will he will be
held to take under the will and not under the law unless he expressly
elects to take by law. And if the will indicates an intention to make a
gift to the husband, this will amount to a gift even though merely predecatory words are used.
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12588 BULLERDICK, ET AL. V. MILLER, ET AL.

Clay County.

Appeal Dis-

missed. Nichols, J. April 8, 1927.
Where a case has already been reversed, and a new trial ordered, there
is no occasion for a new appeal asking a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence.
12885 CHRISTMAN, ADMR. V. HACK. Martin County. Affirmed. Remy, J.
April 20, 1927.
Under Burns' 1926, sec. 554, a claimant against a decedent's estate may
testify as to service performed before the death of the decedent which
involve his claim, in the discretion of the court. Where a primw facie
case has already been made, it is not an abuse of this discretion for the
court to admit such evidence.
12682 CLARK V. FAST, Er AL. Huntington County. Affirmed. Per Cluriam.
April 8, 1927.
Per Curiam.
12710 COMMONWEALTH CASUALTY Co. V. KINCAID. Howard County. Affirmed. April 21, 1927.
An error in admitting testimony is not ground for reversal where the
error could not have injured the appellant's case.
12794 CREECH V. HUBBARD. Clay County. Reversed. Thompson, J. April 20,
1927.
Where there was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably find
its verdict, the trial court should give judgment for the other party non
abstante veredicto.
12990 IN RE DEARMINE V. DEARMINE. Daviess County. Affirmed. Nichols,
J. April 29, 1927.
Where lots in a municipality have adequate egress and ingress, then
the lot owners have only a general public interest and are not entitled to
special damages where certain streets are closed by the municipal authorities.
12678 DIDDF., ET AL v. AMERICAN SECURITY CO, ET AL. Montgomery County. Affirmed. Nichols, J. April 22, 1927.
Where there is an agreement for the vendor to take back an automobile
unless it has been in a collision, this means a collision which injured the
automobile and a purely technical collision will not relieve the vendor of his
liability.
12892 DITZLER POULTRY Co v. FORSYTHE, ET AL. Industrial Board. Re.
versed. April 29, 1927.
Where an employee is killed while driving his own car home from work
after the details of his employment for the day were completed, it cannot
be said that the death occurred in the course of the employment.
12638 DIXIE-PORTLAND FLOUR Co. v. KELSAY-BURNS MILLING Co. Warrick
County. Affirmed. Nichols, J. April 29, 1927.
Where a contract contains a "dispensation clause" providing that the
party shall not be liable for continued performance in case of fire, strikes,
acts of God, etc., this clause will relieve the party of liability to supply
flour where he is a miller and his mill has burned.
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12239 FAIR BUILDING CO., ET AL. V. WINEMAN REALTY Co., ET AL. Marion
County. Affirmed. McMahan, C. J. April 26, 1927.
Where a grant of land is made and a covenant to pay for part of a party
wall if it should be used at a later time is made incidental to this grant,
then this covenant to pay for the wall so used will run with the land
against the assignees of both parties to the grant.

12636 THE

FIDELITY & CASUALTY Co., ET AL. V. SINCLAIR REFINING CO.
Porter County. Affirmed. Nichols, J. April 22, 1927.
Where one contractor gives a bond to cover the performance of its
undertakings and a sub-contractor likewise gives a bond for the performance of its undertakings, the party who contracted with the principal contractor cannot be subrogated to claim on the bond where the sub-contractor
defaults, where there is no privity of contract.

12654 GENERAL HIGHWAYS SYSTEM, INC. v. THOMPSON, ET AL. Vanderburgh County. Petition for rehearing denied. Nichols, J. April 29,
1927.
Where under a mortgage the mortgagor is required to deposit the proceeds of half of the goods sold to the account of the mortgaged debt, he is
left free to apply the other half of such proceeds as he thinks best.
12644 HEROD V. MFrTZGER. Marion County. Affirmed. Remy, J. April 5,
1927.
Affirmed on authority of Groves v. Hobbs (1903) 32 Ind. App. 532, 70
N. E. 279.
12690 HOBBS v. LUDLOW, ET AL. Rush County. Affirmed. Nichols, T. April
8, 1927.
A claimant on a promissory note has ten years in which to bring his
action after the payment is due under the Indiana law and this right to
sue within ten years cannot be barred unless the case is expressly brought
within the exception which holds that if the cause of action is in fact
barred under the law of another state, it will not be recognized in Indiana.
(Burns' 1926, sec. 306.)

12515 HOOSIER

FINANCE COMPANY V. CAMPBELL, ET AL. Gibson County.
Affirmed. April 7, 1927.
Where a mortgagor is entitled to take possession of property in case it
is levied on by creditors of the mortgagor, this possession is such that a
valid lien may be filed against the property on the ground that it is in the
legal possession of the mortgagor.

12827 INDIANAPOLIS PUMP AND TIRE Co. v. SURFACE. Industrial Board.
Reversed. McMahan, C. J. April 5, 1927.
Industrial Board has no jurisdiction to review an applicant for compensation on the ground of change in condition of the injured applicant
where in fact there was no change in position and the ground for review
as given was that the original award was erroneous.
12809 JORDAN V. MIDLAND ACCEPTANCE CORP. Marion County. Affrmed.
Remy, J. April 26, 1927.
Affirmed on authority of Marshall-v. Marshall (1920) 74 Ind. App. 204,
128 N. E. 299.
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12828 KLAMT V. TERRE HAUTE BREWING CO.
Per Curiam. April 29, 1927.

Industrial Board.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.
12700 McGoRAN V. CROMWELL, ET AL. Vigo County. Reversed. Thompson,
J. April 27, 1927.
Where a member of a family is not driving the family automobile on
the business of the head of the family who is the owner of the car, then
no agency relation is involved and the owner is not liable for the negligent
conduct of the driver. The so-called "family automobile doctrine" does
not apply in Indiana.
12840 MASUR v. FREYN. Marion County. Affirmed. Enloe, J. April 20, 1927.
In an action in trover, the complainant has the burden of establishing
the ownership of the property as well as proving conversion by the defendant.
12635 NORTHERN INDIANA FUEL & LIGHT CO. V. ELDRIDGE. DeKalb County.
Affirmed. April 7, 1927.
Where defendant is negligent in leaving gas pipes along the side walk,
this is sufficient proof of negligence for complainant to recover even tbough
an intervening agency caused the pipe to fall on the side walk and thus be
the cause of the complainant's injury.
12826 RICHARD v. THE UNIQUE ILLUSTRATING CO. Sullivan County. Affirmed. Thompson, J. April 5, 1927.
It is error to admit in evidence a post card sent by post master giving
notice of the refusal of merchandise where such evidence is not connected
with the liability of the defendant.
12613 ROSENBERG, ET AL. V. AMERICAN TRUST & SAVINGS BANK OF WHITING,
INDIANA, ET AL. Lake County. Affirmed. Nichols, J. April 29, 1927.
A court order for alimony does not constitute a lien upon land owned
by the divorced husband.
12786 ROWLTrT V. COCRILL. Delaware County. Affirmed. McMahan, C. J.
April 22, 1927.
Where a complaint is not made by demurrer, the case is not subject
to reversal on appeal where defects in the complaint were remedied by
evidence admitted in the trial.
12575-12624 SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE Co. OF AMERICA v. GOTTMAN. Vanderburgh County. Affirmed. McMahan, C. J. April 20, 1927.
Where an insured fails to pay the agreed interest on a bond and the
insurer corresponds with him in regard to extra interest but does not refer
to terminating the policy if the additional amount is not paid, the insurer
may not terminate the policy without giving notice to the insured.
12673 SIMPSON V. SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO., EU AL. Miami County. Affirmel. April 6, 1927.
An exception to an instruction by endorsement on the margin of the
contract itself, although signed by the trial judge, is not a sufficient compliance with the statute unless it is dated. (Burns' 1926, sec. 385.)
12565 SLUSS V. THERMOID RUBBER Co. Boone County. Affirmed. Per Curiam.
April 8, 1927.
Per Curiam.
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12864 STATE OF INDIANA CONSERVATION DET. v. NATTKEMPER.

Industrial
Board. Reversed. Thompson, J. April 21, 1927.
A game warden is an officer of the state and not an employee of the
Fish and Game Commission so far as recovery goes under the Workmen's
Compensation ,Act.
12847 THORSTON v. CARTER. Johnson County. Affirmed. McMahan, C. J.
April 8, 1927.
Where one is liable under a contract to make repairs on a ditch, the
damages that are recoverable for breach of this provision may cover not
only the cost of the repairs but reasonable damages caused by failure to
make the repairs according to the contract.
12549 THE TRI STATE LOAN & TRUST COMPANY, EXECUTOR, ETC. V. BELL,
L- AL. Allen County. Appeal dismissed. Nichols, J., April 22, 1927.
A judgment in favor of those who were parties to the action will be
sustained on appeal, since it is only those who can be injured by being
omitted that can raise an objection.
12761 WESTERN OIL REFINING Co. v. GLENDENNING. Clinton County. Reversed. Nichols, J. April 22, 1927.
There can be no recovery from a principal in a case of malicious prosecution unless it is established that the agent who tarted the prosecution
was acting with the authority of his principal in so doing.
12540 WOLF HOTEL COMPANY V. PARKER. St. Joseph County. Affirmed.
McMahan, C. J. April 27, 1927.
A landlord may be liable for damage to goods in tenant's trunk if the
damage is caused by water entering basement which the landlord in the
exercise of his duties of reasonable care could have prevented.

